**Supplementary Materials**

Table S1. Includede quantitative studies and their components

| **Title** | **Authors, year** | **Phy Ince** | **Phy Inco** | **Phy Dens** | **S P** | **P M** | **C T** | **T R** | **V F Phy** | **T & S H** | **V C F P** | **N C F P** | **I C** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Investigation of the Existence of Supplier-Induced Demand in use of Gastrostomy Among Older Adults A Retrospective Cohort Study | Toshiki Maeda, Akira Babazono, Takumi Nishi,  Midori Yasui, and Yumi Harano (2016) |  |  | 🗸 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |
| Gatekeeper incentives and demand inducement An empirical analysis of care managers in the Japanese long-term care insurance program | Shinya Sugawara, Jiro Nakamura (2016) |  |  | 🗸 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Over-utilization of cesarean sections and misclassification error | Alejandro Arrieta (2015) | 🗸 |  |  |  | 🗸 |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |
| Supplier-Induced Demand for Chronic Disease Care in Japan Multilevel Analysis of the Association between Physician Density and Physician-Patient Encounter Frequenc | Miho Sekimoto, MasakoIi (2015) |  |  | 🗸 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |
| Supplier-induced demand for newborn treatment Evidence from | Hitoshi Shigeokaa, Kiyohide Fushimib |  |  |  |  | 🗸 |  |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Changes in the remuneration system for general practitioners effects on contact type and consultation | Christel E, et al (2014) |  |  |  |  |  | 🗸 |  |  |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Medical Fee Reforms, Changes in Medical Supply Densities, and Supplier-Induced Demand Emprical Evidence from Japan | MICHIO YUDA (2013) |  | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |  |  |  | 🗸 |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Moral hazad and supplier-induced demand emprical evidence in general practice | CHRISTEL E. VAN DIJK, et al (2013) | 🗸 |  |  | 🗸 |  |  |  |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Incentives in U.S. Healthcare Operations | Tinglong Dai (2013) | 🗸 | 🗸 |  | 🗸 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 🗸 |
| Decision-making in general practice the effect of financial incentives on the use of laboratory analyses | Siri Fauli Munkerud (2012) |  | 🗸 |  | 🗸 |  |  |  | 🗸 |  |  | 🗸 |  |
| Essays on Health Economics | Christine Pal Chee (2012) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Private hospital accreditation and inducement of care under the Ghanaian National Insurance | Eugenia Amporfu (2011) |  |  |  |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |  | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |
| Do doctors induce demand? | Beomsoo Kim (2010) | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |  |  | 🗸 |  |  |  |  | 🗸 |  |
| The effect of physicians' remuneration system on the Caesarean section rate The Uruguayan case | Patricia Triunfo, Máximo Rossi (2009) |  | 🗸 |  |  | 🗸 |  | 🗸 |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |
| Factors related to treatment intensity in Swiss primary care | André Busato, Pius Matter and Beat Künzi (2009) |  |  | 🗸 |  |  |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |
| Evidence of physician (supplier) induced demand and physician altruism | CHIA-CHENG LIAO (2009) | 🗸 |  | 🗸 |  | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |
| Primary physicians' response to changes in fees | Jostein Grytten, Fredrik Carlsen, Irene Skau (2008) |  | 🗸 |  | 🗸 |  | 🗸 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Primary care physician supply and other key determinants of health care utilisation The case of | André Busato and Beat Künzi (2008) |  |  | 🗸 |  |  |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |
| Fertility rate, use of cesarean delivery, and the role of information gap Evidence from Taiwan | Ke-Zong Ma (2007) |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |  |  |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Medicare fees and physicians' medicare service volume Beneficiaries treated and services per beneficiary | Jack Hadley, James D. Reschovsky (2006) |  | 🗸 |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |  | 🗸 |  |  |  | 🗸 |
| Possession of health insurance in Australia - how does it affect hospital use and outcomes | Kate Brameld, D’Arcy Holman, Rachael Moorin (2006) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Physician supply, supplier-induced demand and competition Empirical evidence from a single-payer | Sudha Xirasagar and Herng-Ching Lin (2006) |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |  |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |  |  |
| GP reimbursement and visiting behaviour in | David Maddena, Anne Nolanb, and Brian Nolan (2005) |  |  |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| The effects of a patient shortage on general practitioners' future income and list of patients | Tor Iversen (2004) |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |  | 🗸 |  |  | 🗸 |  |  | 🗸 |  |
| Fixed fees and physician-induced demand A panel data study on French physicians | Eric Delattrea and Brigitte Dormont (2003) |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |  | 🗸 |  | 🗸 |  |  |  |  |
| Type of contract and supplier-induced demand for primary physicians in Norway | Jostein Grytten , Rune Sørensen (2001) | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |  | 🗸 |  |
| The income effect and supplier induced demand. Evidence from primary physician services in | Jostein Grytten, Fredrik Carlsen & Irene Skau (2001) |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |
| Assessing the impact of payment method and practice setting on German physicians' practice | Karen Kinder (2001) |  | 🗸 |  |  |  | 🗸 |  | 🗸 |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |
| Competition and supplier-induced demand in a health care system with fixed fees | RUNE J. SØRENSEN AND JOSTEIN GRYTTEN (1999) |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |  |  |  | 🗸 |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |
| The impact of Taiwan's national health insurance on physician and patient behavior Vaginal delivery versus cesarean section | Yi-Wen Tsai (1998) |  | 🗸 |  |  |  |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| More physicians Improved availability or induced demand | FREDRIK CARLSEN AND JOSTEIN GRYTTEN (1998) |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |  |  |  | 🗸 |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |
| Supplier inducement--its relative effect on demand and utilization | Jostein Grytten (1992) |  |  | 🗸 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |
| Physician-induced demand by Irish GPs | A. DALE TUSSING and MARTHA A. WOJTOWYCZ (1986) | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| The impact of changing medicare reimbursment rates on physician-induced demand | Thomas H. Rice (1983) |  | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |  |  | 🗸 |  |  |  | 🗸 |

*Note:*physicians’ incentive to pecuniary profit (target income) **Phy Ince,** physicians’ current income **Phy Inco,** physician/population ratio **Phy Dens,** service price (tariff) **S P,** payment method **P M,** consultation time **C T,** type of recruitment of physicians **T R,** visible features of physician **V C Phy,** type and size of hospital **T & S H,** visible clinical features of patients **V C F P,** non-clinical features of patient **N C F P,** insurance coverage **I C**.